uals. Incentive compatibility is simply the property that, for each individual, the best thing to do in this particular direct game is to report private information truthfully as long as all other individuals are also truthfully reporting their private information.
This fundamental insight into mechanism design with incomplete information has allowed many allocation problems to be analyzed and forms the basis for the modern theory of second-best welfare analysis (Holmstrom and Myerson 1983; Prescott and Townsend 1984; Laffont 1985) . This insight provided a major technical breakthrough because the analysis of Pareto-optimal allocations in economies with private information could be tractably formulated as a standard programming problem: maximizing a planner's objective function subject to the usual constraints, augmented by an additional set of incentive constraints. Furthermore, the revelation principle suggested properties of actual institutions that would be capable of' producing these optimal allocations. In this way, the formal analysis of' welfare economics and institutions was brought under a single unified approach.
Unfortunately, there is a serious caveat to the "revelation principle" link between institutions and welfare analysis. Incentive compatibility does not imply any restrictions on individual incentives in the direct revelation game if other individuals are not telling the truth (Postlewaite and Schmeidler 1987) . Consequently, there can (and often will) exist other equilibrium outcomes to the direct game that are undesirable (e.g., by the criterion of' Pareto optimality). There exist several prominent examples of' this problem (Demski and Sappington [1984] and Bhattacharya [1987] in reference to incentive contracts, Milgrom [1981] in auctions, and Palfrey and Srivastava [1987] in the implementation of' rational expectations equilibria) that threaten the value of this whole approach to mechanism design.
These recent examples illustrate that the implementation problem has two equally important aspects. In order to implement an allocation rule, a mechanism must be constrained not only by the property that it has an equilibrium that produces desirable outcomes but also by the property that other undesirable outcomes do not arise as equilibria.
Thus the work associated with the revelation principle has elegantly proved that incentive compatibility is a necessary condition for imnplementation, but the examples cited above indicate that incentive compatibility may not be a sufficient condition.
In this paper, we show that this multiplicity problem can be solved in the large and important class of environments in which private information is of the "private-values" variety; that is, each individual's utility depends only on the outcome and his or her own private information. To achieve this result, a mild refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium is adopted and more complex institutions than "direct games" are required. Thus we simultaneously provide a sufficiency proof' of incentive compatibility for unique implementation in a broad class of environments and also, via a constructive proof, indicate how our solution may have implications for the details of' institutional design.
II. Relation to the Literature
In attempts to resolve problems of' multiple equilibria in games, two approaches have been followed in the literature. One approach attempts to eliminate multiple equilibria by refining the notion of ' equilibrium (e.g., Selten 1975; Grossman and Perry 1986; Kohlberg and Mertens 1986; Banks and Sobel 1987; Cho and Kreps 1987) . The second approach asks whether, given an equilibrium concept, the mechanism being played by the agents can be designed so as to eliminate undesirable equilibria while retaining desirable ones (see Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin 1979; Maskin 1985; Postlewaite 1985; Postlewaite and Schmeidler 1986; Palfrey and Srivastava 1987, in press ).
This paper continues a line of' inquiry followed by Palfrey and Srivastava (1986) and Moore and Repullo (1988) that merged these two approaches and asked whether flexibility in mechanism design together with a refined equilibrium concept could resolve the multiplicity problem when problems of asymmetric information are absent (i.e., in complete information environments). Earlier applications of' this approach to specific complete information settings can be found in Crawford (1979) , Moulin (1979), and Reichelstein (1985) . Our result is that in a large class of' settings with asymmetric information, all multiplicity problems can be resolved with a simple strengthening of' Bayesian Nash equilibrium: equilibrium in which no individual uses a weakly dominated strategy. This is a mild condition since a weakly dominated strategy is always (weakly) inferior to some other strategy regardless of the strategies employed by the other players and is strictly inferior for some strategies others might use. An important reason for using this refinement is that Bayesian Nash equilibrium places insufficient restrictions on behavior, leading to the implausible use of weakly dominated strategies. This is illustrated clearly by example 2 of' Section IV and is precisely the type of' behavior excluded by our refinement.
The domain restrictions we impose are that no agent is ever completely indifferent over all alternatives, values are private, and there are at least three agents. We do not require a "no veto power" condition (as in, e.g., Maskin [1977] and Abreu and Sen [1986] Our possibility result stands in sharp contrast to previous results on implementation with incomplete information. Palfrey and Srivastava (in press) , extending the earlier analysis of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) , show that a condition called Bayesian monotonicity is necessary for implementation in (unrefined) Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
As shown in Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) , many "nice" allocation rules do not satisfy this condition even if the domain of application is restricted to the set of pure exchange economies. In Section IV of this paper, we provide the even more striking example of an allocation rule that is implementable in dominant strategies but not in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
With complete information, several positive results have been obtained. Maskin (1977) showed that a condition termed monotonicity is necessary for Nash implementation and, together with a no veto power condition and at least three agents, is also sufficient (Saijo 1988) . Monotonicity is satisfied by many economically interesting sets of allocation rules. For example, the correspondence that associates each pure exchange neoclassical economy with the set of Paretooptimal redistributions is monotonic, as is the (constrained) Walrasian correspondence. However, most allocation rules (i.e., single-valued correspondences) are not monotonic and thus not Nash implementable. Moore and Repullo (1988) (see also Abreu and Sen 1986) show that the class of implementable allocation rules expands significantly if the mechanism is played sequentially and subgame perfection is imposed on the equilibrium. Palfrey and Srivastava (1986) x T2 x ... X T'. An allocation rule is a function x: T-* A. Let X = {x:
T --A} be the set of all allocation rules.
Each agent is assumed to know his own type but not necessarily that of any other agent. The prior distribution over types is given by a distribution q on T. To simplify notation, we assume that the support of ql(t It -) equals T" for all i and t. This implies that the type of any agent is purely private information in the sense that even by pooling the information of all agents except i, i's type cannot be narrowed down.
Given an allocation rule x E X, the (interim) expected utility to i conditional on ti is denoted by Given a joint strategy o = (a-1. ,I), we denote by g(u) the outcome generated by u, where the outcome at t is g(u(t)). The question being posed in this paper can now be formulated precisely: Given an equilibrium concept and an allocation rule, say x, does there exist a mechanism that has x as its unique equilibrium outcome? Following the implementation literature, if there exists such a mechanism, we say that the allocation rule is implementable. We will study implementation using two concepts of equilibrium. This says that no matter what strategies are used by the others, agent i does at least as well at t-by using &rl(t,) instead of u' (t1), while for some strategy combination of the others, he does strictly better at ti by using Cr'(ti).
DEFINITION 5. u is an undominated Bayesian equilibrium ift is a Bayesian equilibrium and a is not weakly dominated.
It is clear that any allocation rule that can be made the unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism must satisfy an incentive compatibility condition. This is immediate from the literature on Bayesian incentive compatibility (e.g., Myerson 1979; Harris and Townsend 1981) .
DEFINITION 6. x: T -* A is incentive compatible if for all i, for all ti,
U(x(ti, t1), t,)dq(t t,) '; U'(x(ti, t,'), t1)dq(t t,) for all t' E T'.
The following result is well known. THEOREM 1. If x is implementable, then x is incentive compatible.
IV. Eliminating Equilibria by Indirect

Mechanisms
To begin our analysis, we consider implementation using Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept. We start with an example showing how indirect mechanisms help alleviate the multiple equilibrium problem.
Example 1.-Consider a pure exchange economy with two goods, an aggregate endowment w E R 2, and two agents. Agent 1 can be of two types, T1 = {t,, t'}, while agent 2 has only one type, so T 2 {t2}.
Preferences are as in figure 1 , and each type of agent 1 is equally likely. Consider the allocation rule given in figure 1. It is easy to check that x is incentive compatible, and it is also (ex post) Pareto optimal.
The direct mechanism is Ml = T', M2 = T2, so the game can be 
Truth telling is clearly an equilibrium to this game, yielding x as the truthful equilibrium outcome. However, this game has another equilibrium, one in which agent 1 says t1 independently of his type. This is an equilibrium because at t' agent 1 is indifferent between x(t) and x(t'). Unfortunately, agent 2 is not indifferent between this strategy and the truthful one: he strictly prefers the outcome when agent 1 reports truthfully. Further, if agent 1 always reports t1, the outcome at t' is inefficient.
In order to overcome this problem, we can attempt to expand the strategy sets of the agents (use an indirect mechanism) or refine the concept of equilibrium (or both). In this particular example, refinements such as undominated equilibrium, (trembling-hland) perfect equilibrium, or proper equilibrium do not rule out the bad equilibrium in the direct mechanism since they would all rely on possible mistakes made by agent 2. Since agent 2 has only one strategy, the refinements do not help. We now show that a simple indirect mecha- In either equilibrium, the outcome at t is x(t), and that at t' is x(t').
In this example, then, a simple extension of the mechanism implemented the desired allocation rule. This naturally raises the question of when indirect mechanisms by themselves are sufficient to implement desirable allocation rules.
To answer this question, consider an incentive-compatible allocation rule x. The associated direct mechanism is M' T' for all i, and g(t) = x(t) for all t. Incentive compatibility ensures that truth telling is an equilibrium to this direct game, yielding x as the truthful equilibrium outcome. As in the example, however, there may be other equilibria to the direct mechanism, and the question is whether these can be eliminated by expanding the mechanism. To examine what these equilibria might be, we first need to examine all possible strategies agents might use. In a direct mechanism, any strategy for agent i is a function from T' into T', say (x': T'--T'. Truth telling is simply the identity function. We call &i a deception by i, the interpretation being that when i is of' type ti, he acts as if he is of type &(t,).
In the example, the "bad" equilibrium strategy by agent 1 was the deception ao(t1) = t, a(tf) = t1. With this notation, incentive compatibility can be rewritten as, for all i, for all t., and for all a: T' T-
JUI(x(t~i ti) t )dq(t it) 'JU'(x(t i, tx(t), t .)dq(t_ ati
This is the standard incentive compatibility condition and says that if in a direct mechanism all other agents are using truthful strategies, then the truthful strategy does at least as well for agent i as any Let ot = (ot I 'tI)and o'= (tI . ot2. ot I oti+1 . ) that a = (&-, ot). Then every candidate for equilibrium in the direct game is a (joint) deception a. If a is being used, the outcome to the direct game is x, where x,(t) = x(ot(t)) for all t. If a is an equilibrium and x, = x, then we have an undesired outcome to the direct game.
The question being posed can now be rephrased to ask when it is possible to add strategies to the direct game so that any a with x,c # x is not an equilibrium. To answer this, fix a such that x, # x. For any agent i, consider giving him an additional message, say mi. For each t, let y(t-I, at(ti)) = g(t1, Imn), the outcome when i plays m' and the other agents play t_ To ensure that a is not an equilibrium, we want agent i to play m' when the other agents are playing a-'. If i plays m' and the others use oa-, the outcome at t isy('(ti), &(ti)). If i uses & and the others use ai the outcome at t is x(t-'(ti), o(t1)). Thus x, is an equilibrium outcome unless, at some ti,
If there exist i, ti, and y such that the inequality above is satisfied, then (x cannot be an equilibrium since agent i will deviate to m'. However, we must also be careful that introducing m' does not lead to x not being an equilibrium outcome; that is, we still want truth telling to be an equilibrium. Thus we must also have that, for all t,' E T Ul(x(t-,i, t,'), t' )dq(t_ i t )-U '(y(t-,i, ot'(t,)), t1 )dq(t t _ ').
Defining y,(t) = y(o-'(ti), o&(ti)), we arrive at the condition called Bayesian monotonicity, which is necessary for implementation.
DEFINITION 7. x: T --A satisfies Bayesian monotonicity if, for any deception a such that x,(t) # x(t) for some t, there exist i, t., and an allocation rule y: T --A such that U'(x(t_ i, tl'), tl')dq(t t' ) U'(y(t,, (t)), t' )dq(t I | tI I) for all tI and (x, (ti ti), ti.)dq (t_ i I ti) < JU'(y, (ti ti.), ti) dq (t -i|ti.)
The next example shows that appealing to indirect mechanisms alone will generally not be enough to solve the implementation prob- Remarkably, x is not implementable in Bayesian equilibrium: let xl (t.) =tb for all i, so x(a(t)) = b for all t. We show below that there do not exist i, y, and t, that satisfy the inequalities required by Bayesian monotonicity. Consequently, in any game in which a is a Bayesian an elibrium with g(o) = x, ac is also a Bayesian equilibrium with g(u) = x.. This has severe welfare implications since xc, -b violates properties ii, iii, and iv.
To show that Bayesian monotonicity is not satisfied requires us to prove that there does not exist y: T -* A that satisfies the first set of inequalities in definition 7, with y, simultaneously satisfying the second inequality. To see this, note first that since a is a "projection" to tb, ye is a constant allocation rule. Furthermore, if y,(t) = b for all t, then x, = y, in which case the second inequality could not be satisfied, so we can limit attention to y's such that y,(t) = a for all t. Since a is the worst element for type tb, the inequality JU1(xX,(t_1i, ti), t1)dq(t_-iIt1-) < JU'(yx(t_1-i, ti), t1i)dq(t 1-iIt1i) implies t/ = ta. Further, since (x(t) = (tb, tb, tb), we must have y(tb, tb, tb) -a. By our choice of y(tb, t, th), the second inequality of definition 7 is satisfied for all i when i is type t4. We need to show that the other elements of y cannot be picked to satisfy the first inequality of definition 7. Since the problem is symmetric, we need consider only agent 1. The expected utility from x at to is 1 -q2 while that from (1 -q)2U'(y(th, t0, t(7), to) + 2q(1 -q)U'(y(th,, th, tj), to) + q2 U I(y(tb,4 t6,), t ) ).
Since y(tb, tb, tb) = a, this reduces to q2 + (1 -q)2L/'(y(tb, t0, to), t01) + 2q(l -q)Ul(y(tb, tb, t(7), t01).
The minimum value of this last expression over y is q , which is greater than 1 -q2, so the first inequality of Bayesian monotonicity must be violated when agent 1 is of type t,. Hence x is not implementable.
Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) present several more examples of' reasonable allocation rules that are not Bayesian implementable even in pure exchange economies. These include allocation rules defined by various notions of optimality and by various notions of equity and fairness. In the next section, we show that these problems may be solved when indirect mechanisms are used together with our mild refinement of Bayesian equilibrium.
V. Undominated Bayesian Equilibrium
In this section, using Bayesian equilibria that do not involve the use of' weakly dominated strategies, we prove the central result of the paper:
Any allocation rule that satisfies incentive compatibility can be made the unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism in a large class of models.
The next definition summarizes a restriction on the environment.
It says that there are no redundant preference types for any agent in the sense that if two types are different, then their preferences over some pair of alternatives must be different.
DEFINITION 8. Value-distinguished types.-For all i, t, t', and t4 #& t', either there exist y z' E A with U'(y', t) ? U'(z', t) and U'(y', t4') < U'(z', t;') or there exist y', z' E A with U'(y', ti) > U'(z', ti) and U'(y', tC') ' U (z , t; ).
In some applications, value distinction may require us to consider random allocation rules. This will be the case if, for example, the difference between types is the difference in risk aversion. In this case, types are value distinguished on the set of' lotteries over A.
Therefore, one may think of A more generally as a set of lotteries and the U'( ) as preferences over lotteries.
Our sufficiency result requires us also to impose the following two mild restrictions on the domain of possible types. 
For all i and t-, there exist b(t-), w(t-) E A with U'(b(t,), t) U'(a, t) for
all a E A and U' (a, t )-U (w(t-), t-) for all a E A.
THEOREM 2. Assume that I 3, that there is no complete indifference, that best and worst elements exist, and that types are value distinguished. If x is incentive compatible, then x can be made the unique undominated Bayesian equilibrium outcome to a mechanism.
The Appendix contains a formal proof of theorem 2 and a detailed construction of a general implementing mechanism. Here we give the intuition behind the construction of the mechanismn and explain how it works.
Following the intuition behind the examples of the previous section, we see that the mechanism is, effectively, a direct mechanism with some additional strategies appended in a way that eliminate undesirable equilibria. Each agent submits a message that has four com- $t" 3 tI w(t,-') w(t') 7 )
6. All other messages with m= I E T ai a,* a,* yl(t., t') and y2(t', t') have the property that U'(y(t4, t'), t4) > U'(y2(t4, t), ti) but U'(y2(ti, t'), tz ) > U'(yI(ti, tz'), t; ). Straightforward methods for extending the mechanism to account for weak value distinction are contained in Palfrey and Srivastava (1986) .
The proof then proceeds in three steps: (1) all equilibria must lie in Do, (2) all equilibria must involve "truthful" reports (i.e., m' = for all i, 4), and (3) the joint strategy where -'(t4) = (t, t, 0, b(t)) for all i is an equilibrium.
To prove step 1, we show that no equilibrium can lie in D' for any i.
Suppose that agent i is of type ti. Note first that reporting m4 = a with Uz(a, ti) < Uz(b(t4), ti) is weakly dominated; changing a to b(ti) is strictly better for i at several m -, and if the rest of m' is unaltered, i is never worse off. Without loss of generality, then, suppose that m' = b(t4).
Next, we note that there is no equilibrium with k1 > 0 for some i. To see this, suppose thatJ c ki <J + 1 for some nonnegative integerJ ' I + 1 and k. # 0. Then (k, + J + 1)/2 weakly dominates since i is strictly better off somewhere in the bottom row of the table and no worse off anywhere.
A similar argument applies for i if m2 # m'. We conclude that all equilibria must lie in Do, with m 0 = and ml = ml for allj.
The next step is to observe that at t, playing (ti, ti, 0, b(t4)) with t' t 4 is weakly dominated by (ti, tz , ki, b(t')). This change alters the outcome only in rows 2, 3, and 6. In row 2, the outcome changes from yl (t, 4') This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Mon, 07 Mar 2016 23:24:11 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions to y2(tz, t'). By construction, U'(y2(t,, t), tI) > U I(y (4, t), 4-), so i is better off. In rows 3 and 6, i is never worse off.
Hence the only possible equilibrium is o'(tL) = (ti, tL, 0, b(t-)) for all and ti. To see that this is indeed an undominated Bayesian equilibrium, we first note that incentive compatibility implies that when all]j ' i play a-, a' is a best response for i since a unilateral deviation by can change the outcome only from x(t) to x(ti, t') at t. To see that it is not weakly dominated, we have to consider each possible deviation by i and all possible strategies by others. These cases are covered in detail in the Appendix and are easily checked by inspection of the table.
To conclude, the only equilibria are o'(t1) = (ti, ti, 0, bi) for all i and ti, where bi is a best element at ti, and all these equilibria yield x as the outcome. Hence, this mechanism implements x. If' some individual has more than one best element, then there are multiple equilibria, but all equilibria produce x as the outcome. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategies are "interchangeable" since they differ only in the last component of the message space.
VI. Common Values
The most significant assumption in theorem 2 is private values. Even though a large majority of applications to date of Bayesian games to economic problems and applications of the revelation principle to mechanism design have used this assumption, it is clearly quite restrictive. Our general possibility result does not apply with nearly the same force in settings with common values, which we now discuss.
The model itself is easily modified to incorporate common values.
To do this, we write the utility function of agent i at t as U'(, t) instead of U'(, 4), but we still assume that, at t, i observes only t4 and that there is no moving support. Economic examples of common-value allocation problems include oil lease auctions studied by Wilson (1977) and others and oligopoly with private information about demand studied by Palfrey (1985) and others. In the auction, n bidders submit competitive bids for the right to drill for oil at a specified location. The oil they drill for has a common value to all bidders, but they differ in their (correlated) private estimates of how much oil will be found and recovered. In the oligopoly setting, firms face a common demand curve for a homogeneous product but have different (correlated)
estimates of the parameters of the demand curve. These estimates are privately known. In both of these examples, ti corresponds to an individual estimate, and U' corresponds to a conditional expected value of the oil or output, net of an accepted bid or production costs. This conditional expectation will generally be different when conditioned on the entire vector of estimates rather than being conditioned only {Ui(x(t t, 4), t)dq(t t)-I U'(x(t i, C), t)dq(t 4t) for all tj E T.
Let V'(y, t) = f U'(y(ti, t), t)dq(tl tt). The following theorem yields a necessary condition for implementing an allocation rule.
THEOREM 3. If x is implementable in undominated Bayesian equilibrium, then x is incentive compatible, and for any (x: T--T, x,,(t) # x(t) for some t implies that at least one of the following conditions holds: (a) There exist i, ti, and y E X with U'(x (t it,'), t ,,t,' dq (t i , -t U'(y (t iot'(t), t it,' dq (t i|t,'
for all tJ E T, and UI(Xa(t isti tri t )dq(t iti) < Ul(y'e(t i ti), t i t.)dq(t I~t.). In this case, we inust have U'(y I (ti, t'), t/') > U'(y2(t_, t/'), tC) for some t where t,' = o&'(ti). Now, consider 1-'(ti) = tl for all ti, yielding Ul(yI(t1, tl ), ti) ' U'(y2(t-1, tl'), ti), which says that t, and tj are value distinguished. The assumption of no complete indifference yields the existence of z1 and Z2 satisfying the requirements of the condition.
Except in private-values models, conditions b and c appear to be very strong, in fact sufficiently strong that they seem unlikely to be satisfied in general applications. This suggests that undominated Bayesian implementation is not that different from (unrefined)
Bayesian implementation once one moves beyond private-value domains with value-distinguished types.
The following example, which is a variant of our earlier example, illustrates the difficulties arising with common values. Note that M \ (D1 U D2) UV= I DI. Let D'3A = {m E DjIj V i, ml2 $ ml, ml E [I + 1, I + 2); ml = m', ml =0, D3B = {m E DIIj i,m2 = ml, ml E [I + 1, I + 2); ml ml, ml =0, DI = {m E DIVji, mj = m', ml [I + 1, I + 2); mil $m}, D = {m E DIVj $ i, mj2 l ml, ml $ m', ml E [I + 1, + 2); ml $ m }, D5 = {m E DI~j I i, mJ2 = ml, m3 E? [i, i + 1)}, D5A = {m E D'I Im' $ ml or ml = ml and ml 7$ O}, D6 = {all other m}.
For m E D6, let i* be the smallest i such that ms-ml3 for allj, and let a.* = i4.
The outcome function is given by x(t) if m E D1 and ml t x(t) if m E D2 andm = t yl(t, t4') if m E D3A and ml = t, ml = t Vj i a. ifm D3B and m4 = a. We start by showing that o-(t,) = (ti, ti, 0, b(ti)) for all i and t, which lies in D1 for all t, is a Bayesian equilibrium. This can be seen by noting that a unilateral deviation by i from this strategy affects the outcome only if i changes mi.
(Note that this would not be true if I = 2 since in that case D2 n (D' U D4) $X 0.) If, at ti, i instead reports mli = t, the outcome at t is x(t,, t') instead of x(t-, t). Incentive compatibility now directly implies that r is a Bayesian equilibrium.
Next, we argue that (r is not weakly dominated. To see this, note first that not reporting a best element in the fourth component of the message is always weakly dominated since the report in this component is always used in an agent's favor. Without loss of generality, therefore, we assume that m. = b (t,) for all i, 4.
Next, we consider four possible types of deviations by i at 1, and show that none of these deviations weakly dominates (t,, ti, 0, b(ti)). (i) ml =X t$ : In this case, i is strictly worse off when ml = (/j, 1,, i, a,) for all j $ i since the outcome moves from b(tl) to w(t4).
(ii) ml = (t4, ti, ki, b(ti)), k-> 0: Again, i is strictly worse off when ml = (t1, 4, i, aj) for allj $7 i. (iii) m' = (4, tj, k-, b(t4)),j $ i: In this case, i is again strictly worse off when mi = (t1, t, i, a.) for allj $ i since the outcome changes from b(t4) to w(t4). (iv) ml = (t4, t/', k-, b(t)), t4' $& t4: Here i is strictly worse off when ml = (tj, t4, I + 1, a1) since the outcome changes from yI(t4, t4') toy2(t4, tI). We conclude that r is an undominated Bayesian equilibrium, yielding x as the outcome. First, note that there is no equilibrium at t with mi > 0 for some i. To see this, let J be an integer such that J < ml < J + 1. Then, reporting m' =h except ?ih = (ml + J + 1)/2 weakly dominates reporting ml since there is a configuration of messages in D6 such that g(m -', ml) = w(t,) but g(m, ml) Ml4 b(t), and no configuration of messages such that UY(g(m), ti) > Ul(g(m -i mli), 1). Second, &r(t,) (t, ti, 0, b(t)) is weakly dominated by '(t1) (t1' t1, 1/2, b(tI)) and o(14) = (1, t$', 0, b(tI)) with I' & t17 is weakly dominated by `(t1) (t; tC I/2, b(tl)). This leaves only (T'(1,) = (t', 1 0, b.), where b, is a best element at tI. We claim that ml (t, ,k, &9) weakly dominates this strategy. The outcome changes only in D3 and Dei. In D3, the outcome changes from yI(t', tI) to y2(t', t1), so i is strictly better off since U'(y2(1 t), 1,) > U(yi(t.1, 1t), t1); i is no worse off in D6. This concludes the proof of theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3
The revelation principle implies that x is incentive compatible. Let (M, g) implement x, let r be an equilibrium with g(r) = x, and let xx $& x for some t.
Then r,, yielding xQ as the outcome, is not an undominated Bayesian equilibrium. Two cases arise: either o-. is not a Bayesian equilibrium or it is one. In the first case the argument showing Bayesian monotonicity is necessary, for
Bayesian implementation yields condition a.
Suppose, then, that (ra, is a Bayesian equilibrium. Then it must be weakly dominated, so there exist i, L, and Tm such that { U(g(dr -i, ), t)dq(t _ ) | { U(g( -, a (t)), i)dq(i i tI) (A 1) for all 0r with strict inequality holding for some 0-. Note that (1(t,) t , since otherwise r' (t) = r(t), which would imply that r is weakly dominated, a contradiction.
Let -9'(t') =hi for all t.'. Since a is not weakly dominated at (t1), we get either (i) [u,(g(, a') We have thus shown that there exist i, ti4l, y, z1, and z9 such that 
